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INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ARMITAGE

THROUGH MR. WIGG *Wigg*SUBJECT: Comments on, and Possible Response to, 2/11/88
New York Times Afghanistan Editorial

Yesterday's NYT has two ~~closely~~ related pieces on Afghanistan which you may have seen. The first deals with the bypassing of the President on the 1985 US decision on an aid cutoff to the Resistance in the context of a Soviet withdrawal. The second is an emotional editorial in essence attacking the very mention of the issue as threatening the conclusion of an agreement with the Soviets on Afghanistan.

The editorial is potentially itself damaging to US policy on Afghanistan as it represents the first significant public attempt to inject partisanship in what in fact remains a model case of strong bi-partisan support for the President's policy. In my opinion, this line will soon -- if left unanswered -- be taken up by various others who until now have been reluctant to criticize US policy.

The editorial's thrust is that an agreement on a negotiated settlement is about to be had, and risks being torpedoed by "hard-liners" raising "new objections" and asking that the US "renege on its pledge to end rebel aid."

In addition, the editorial plays into Soviet hands by contributing to pressure for quick signing of an agreement and therefore also possible neglect of some significant details and key issues.

It, in short misunderstands and mistates the issues involved and should not be left unanswered. I understand that negotiations may be at a sensitive stage, but believe that a public response is in order. Should you wish to proceed with such a response, I have attached a draft Letter to the Editor that addresses the main problem areas raised by the Editorial.

Elie
Elie D. Krakowski

Concur

ISA/NESA

To The Editor:

Your editorial of February 11, 1988 "Take a Yes on Afghanistan" seriously mistates the issues. By injecting partisanship where none exists, in what, in fact, remains a model case of strong bi-partisan support for the President's policy the editorial does a disservice to the very cause you mean to support.

The thrust of the piece, in short, was that an agreement is about to be reached on a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, and that this agreement risks being torpedoed by "hardliners" raising "new objections" and asking that the US "renege on its pledge to end rebel aid."

While we sincerely hope that we are moving closer to an agreement on Soviet withdrawal, and while Mr. Gorbachev's recent statement represents a "positive step," we are not there yet. When one deals, as we do, not just with words and actions, but with their consequences, one has to be particularly careful about the distinction between hope and reality, aspiration and fact.

Your editorial, although it seems to take Soviet pronouncements at face-value, refers to important elements of Moscow's position with such qualifiers as "sounds as if," "appears," or "Moscow has apparently promised." There could be, I would submit, significant differences between apparent promises and concrete undertakings in black and white. Furthermore, there are potentially further significant differences between such written agreements and their implementation.

Current Administration efforts are focused on minimizing these potential differences between promise and reality. There are no

"new objections" or attempts to get us to "renege" on any pledge. The difference between the 1985 agreements and current discussions is the difference between a general statement of intent, and detailed discussions of future undertakings. The 1985 agreement was a general statement, with less indication of Soviet seriousness than at present. Current negotiations are occurring in a different, more positive context. They consist in fleshing out the specifics, and ensuring that as little as possible is left to chance, wishful thinking, and trust.

The argument that to press what you erroneously call "new" and "misplaced and excessive concerns" could "even infuriate Soviet leaders enough to upset negotiations" is intriguing. Is it not a little strange to argue that Moscow is suffering in Afghanistan and wants badly to withdraw, and in almost the same breath maintain that if requests are made to ensure compliance, the Soviets might just walk out? Who are we to give away what the Afghans have fought so long and hard for? Some might argue that it is your solicitude for Soviet sensibilities in the face of Moscow's brutal record in Afghanistan that is misplaced and exaggerated.

The Afghan Freedom Fighters, as President Reagan stated it, deserve US support "not just to fight and die for freedom, but to fight and win freedom." This remains the objective of our policy and therefore of ongoing negotiations.

Remains of Six Fliers From War Identified

WASHINGTON, Feb. 10 (AP) — Six sets of remains, including one returned two and a half years ago, have been positively identified as Navy and Air Force fliers missing from the Vietnam War, the Pentagon said Tuesday.

The remains were identified by an Army laboratory in Honolulu. They will be transported from Hickam Air Force Base in Hawaii to Travis Air Force Base, Calif., on Thursday after a full military honors ceremony, said a Pentagon spokesman, Dan Howard.

Five of the six were in the same group of remains, repatriated to the United States by the Vietnamese Government last November. The remains of the sixth were repatriated in August 1985, but efforts to identify them were unsuccessful until recently, the Pentagon said.

The Pentagon said these were the missing men:

CAPAS, Col. Franklin A. of the Air Force, lost over North Vietnam on April 28, 1967. Colonel Capas was born on Jan. 18, 1934, and listed his home of record as Spanish Fork, Utah.

SAP 254U, Col. Oscar M. Jr. of the Air Force, lost over North Vietnam on Nov. 18, 1967. Colonel Dardeau was born on Dec. 11, 1931, and listed his home as Villa Platte, La.

POWERS, Capt. Trent R. of the Navy, lost over North Vietnam on Oct. 31, 1967. Captain Powers was born on Aug. 24, 1930, and listed his home as Minneapolis.

LENNHOFF, Lieut. Col. Edward W. of the Air Force, lost over North Vietnam on Nov. 18, 1967. Colonel Lehnhoff was born on March 14, 1936, and listed his home as Fort Scott, Kan.

McKINNEY, Capt. Edwin B. of the Navy, lost over North Vietnam on April 24, 1967. Commander Tucker was born on Feb. 1, 1935, and listed his home as Baldwinville, Mass.

McKINNEY, Lieut. Clemie, of the Navy, lost over North Vietnam on April 14, 1972. Lieutenant McKinney was born on Jan. 25, 1945, and listed his home as Cleveland.

The Pentagon said Lieutenant McKinney's remains were among those recovered more than two years ago.

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The Army, by contrast, shows an exposure rate of 1.41 cases per 1,000; the Marine Corps, 1 case per 1,000; and the Air Force 0.99 case per 1,000.

Men are still much more likely to test positively for the disease than women, Pentagon statistics show, and blacks have a higher positive rate than whites. Among the recruit applicants tested since October 1985, the positive rate for men was 1.55 cases per 1,000, compared with 0.67 per 1,000 for women.

Pentagon officials said they believe the overall exposure rate they are seeing is probably higher than that for the American population as a whole, because recruit applicants are more likely to be young and sexually active.

Take a Yes for Afghanistan

The United States has been trying for eight years to drive Soviet troops from Afghanistan. On Monday, Mikhail Gorbachev announced that the troops would all be gone by March 1989 if the U.S. keeps its pledge to stop aiding the Afghan rebels. It was an extraordinary statement, hailed by the Reagan Administration as "a positive step." Yet some administration hard-liners raise new objections. And now, incredibly, they risk unwinding the deal by claiming that the State Department agreed to halt rebel aid without President Reagan's approval.

The hard-liners warn that Moscow may be setting a trap to put the onus of diplomatic failure on the West. That's how they read Mr. Gorbachev's saying that he will act only after Pakistan, Afghanistan and the rebels reach agreement through a U.N. intermediary. But the Gorbachev withdrawal pledge eliminates the biggest outstanding obstacle in the talks. How on earth could it be construed as imposing settlement? If anything, the speech sounds as if he's telling Kabul to settle up.

Perhaps the hard-liners also feel they can drive a better bargain with Moscow if the U.S. reneges on its pledge to end rebel aid. More likely, this tactic will lead Moscow to pull back on its part of the deal and jeopardize what Mr. Reagan says he most desires, a swift Soviet exit.

Moscow appears to have met all major negotiating conditions. It no longer demands a coalition government to include Afghan Communists. If, following Soviet withdrawal, the Afghans fail to form one themselves, Mr. Gorbachev says "don't expect us" to step in. But Pakistan foolishly continues to press for a unity government, though putting rebels and Communists together seems unattainable.

Soviet leaders agreed to complete the withdrawal in 10 months, compared with the West's demand for eight. Moscow also has apparently promised to remove the bulk of its forces early on, to eschew offensive operations during departure and to extract advisers working with Afghan forces.

Some U.S. and Pakistani officials now seem interested in reopening several key problems. For instance, U.S. aid to the rebels is supposed to cease 60 days after formal agreement is reached, and before Soviet withdrawals actually commence. Some Administration officials want aid to continue until most Soviet troops are gone. Also, no provision was made for ending Soviet aid to the Afghan Govern-

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pressure on its agents during the investigation into the Marine spy scandal at the US Embassy in Moscow, ABC's Bill Greenwood reports. But SIS chief ADM J.E. Gordon tells ABC an internal Navy review has found no illegalities or improprieties by SIS agents in the case.

Senate testimony on Panamanian Leader Manuel Noriega is reported by all networks. ABC reports on IMF ratification.

(Verbatim transcripts of summarized items available from SAP/AAR, 4C881. Other transcripts available include: TR-25, C-SPAN, 31 Jan 1988, speech by National Security Adviser LTC Colin Powell at the Joint Center for Political Studies' Salute to Black Elected Officials; TR-26, CBS's "60 Minutes," 7 Feb 1988, interview with Panamanian Leader GEN Manuel Noriega.)

ment, and U.S. officials are thinking of reneging that question.

These concerns seem misplaced and excessive. It's hard to imagine the Soviet-backed Afghan Government surviving long after the initial Soviet pullout. To press these issues serves no purpose other than to rub Soviet noses in their arrogant mistake. It might even infuriate Soviet leaders enough to upset negotiations.

From all appearances, Moscow has made the painful decision to lose a war. The U.S. is now on the verge of achieving what it has not achieved since the Austrian State Treaty of 1955: the removal of Russian occupation forces. This is a testament to the hardheaded policy pursued by Mr. Reagan and Congress. If the Russians have decided to leave, the task for the U.S. is to help them on their way.

Seoul, Tokyo ask U.N. action on plane

NEW YORK — Japan and South Korea asked yesterday for an urgent meeting of the United Nations Security Council over the disappearance last November of a South Korean airliner with the loss of all 115 passengers and crew. South Korea has accused Communist North Korea of planting a bomb aboard the Korean Air plane believed to have exploded off Burma while on a flight from Baghdad to Seoul.

North Korea has accused South Korea of plotting the destruction of its own plane to help ensure the election victory last December of Roh Tae-woo, chosen successor of South Korean President Chun Doo-hwan. Security Council members will meet privately tomorrow to consider the requests, contained in separate letters to the Council president, Ambassador Vernon Walters of the United States. Japan is currently a member of the 15-nation council. South Korea is not a full U.N. member but, like North Korea, has observer status.

AIDS in Military: 5,890 Positive of 3.9 Million Tested

Army Has Highest Incidence, Air Force Lowest; Overall Rate Steady Since 1985

By Norman Black
Associated Press

Two years after launching the world's most extensive AIDS screening program, the Defense Department has tested nearly 4 million people and identified 5,890 carrying the deadly virus.

The testing has cost \$43.1 million so far and is projected to cost an additional \$25.5 million this fiscal year.

The most recent statistics include test results not only for recruit applicants—those trying to join the military—but also for those on active duty and those in the National Guard and reserves.

They are the first statistics to provide a complete picture of test results through fiscal 1987, which ended last Sept. 30.

If all the groups are combined, the Pentagon has tested the blood of 3.9 million individuals since October 1985 when it launched the required immune deficiency syndrome screening effort. Of that total, roughly 1.5 cases of AIDS in-

fection have been detected out of every 1,000 individuals screened, or 5,890 altogether.

On the active-duty side, the Defense Department said it had screened 2.18 million individuals over the past two years, of whom 3,336 tested positive.

Among the Army National Guard and Air National Guard members tested to date, there have been 387 positives out of 300,702 screened, the statistics show. As for the reserve units of the four services, where testing is only now becoming widespread, 183 cases have been found after screening 99,191 individuals.

And on the recruit applicant side, the Pentagon said that as of December it had screened 1.38 million men and women since the fall of 1985. Of that total, 1,984 tested positively.

AIDS is an incurable disease caused by a virus that attacks the body's immune system and its ability to resist infection. It is most frequently spread through sexual intercourse or the sharing of drug needles. According to the Centers

for Disease Control, 51,916 Americans had been diagnosed as having AIDS as of Jan. 25, and an unknown but much greater number of people have been exposed to the virus.

Under Defense Department regulations, any recruit applicant who tests positively for the disease is automatically denied entry into the military. Active-duty personnel who test positively are allowed to remain in the service as long as they show no signs of the disease, but they are restricted from overseas assignments and their condition is closely monitored.

The overall military exposure rate of roughly 1.5 cases per 1,000 has changed little since the start of testing, although the Pentagon continues to chart differences between the various services, individuals from different regions, and men and women.

The Navy, with its bases concentrated on the East and West coasts, continues to post the highest exposure rate for active-duty personnel with roughly 2.5 cases per 1,000.

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Engineers re-examine shuttle bolt design

HUNTSVILLE, Ala. — Engineers working on the redesigned space shuttle rockets said yesterday they have discovered a bolt design error that could delay NASA's plans to resume flights Aug. 4.

The engineers at Marshall Space Flight Center and at Morton Thiokol Inc. were trying to determine if the design of 72 bolts used to secure the booster exhaust nozzle should push back the date for the first post-Challenger launch.

"If we convince ourselves it is an acceptable condition, there is no schedule impact," said Royce Mitchell, a member of the Marshall redesign team. "If we took the worst case, we're talking weeks if we have to change the flight and qualification motors."

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Reagan Didn't Know of Afghan Deal

By DAVID K. SHIPLER

Special to the New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 10 — An American commitment in 1985 to end military aid to the Afghan guerrillas at the beginning of a Soviet troop withdrawal was made without the knowledge or approval of President Reagan, according to White House and State Department officials.

Now that a pullout appears to be coming within reach, the commitment has led the Administration to compensate by making stringent demands on the Russians concerning the timetable, peacekeeping and other details of any withdrawal, these officials say.

"We will certainly have a significant political problem that people haven't come to grips with," a State Department official said.

The President's mutual lack of knowledge has caused confusion in White House statements. After the summit meeting here in December, the "White House spokesman, Martin Flisberg, said, 'The first thing that most concern is a pullout of Soviet troops, and then we'll talk about U.S. aid. But it would be premature to say that.'"

It is not clear exactly when Mr. Reagan learned of the commitment, but remarks by the President and aides around the time of the summit most suggested that he had either not been briefed or had not understood the

American position on the timing of the aid cutoff.

The United States retains considerable leverage over the final shape of an agreement, since Washington has made the cutoff of aid to the Islamic guerrillas contingent on a Soviet withdrawal plan acceptable to the Administration. Once the plan is accepted, however, the end of American aid and the start of the pullout are to take place simultaneously 30 days later.

Given President Reagan's vocal backing of "the Resistance," as the Administration calls the guerrillas, some officials say they would rather wait to cut off weapons supplies until well after the 115,000 Soviet troops begin their departure, to make sure it is real.

But the officials see no way now to reopen that question of timing without risking a collapse in the efforts to fashion an accord on a withdrawal. Mikhail S. Gorbachev, the Soviet leader, said on Monday that Soviet troops could begin a 10-month pullout on May 15 if agreement is complete by March 15.

The commitment to make the aid cutoff simultaneous with the start of the withdrawal was given in December 1985. Otherwise, one official said, "There would have been no impetus for anybody to negotiate."

The commitment was reportedly put forth by Michael H. Armacost, Under

Secretary of State for Political Affairs, when he cleared it with Secretary of State George P. Shultz and sent it to the White House. There, officials say, it was cleared by Donald Fortier, head of political-military affairs for the National Security Council, who died in August 1986. Why the matter was not put before President Reagan is not known.

"There was a certain hypothetical quality to some of this" at the time, a senior State Department official said.

Other officials pointed out that the international situation was significantly different in 1985, when few people thought there was much prospect of a negotiated Soviet pullout.

The negotiations have been conducted directly between Pakistan and Afghanistan through the mediation of Diego Cordovez, a United Nations Under Secretary General. Mr. Cordovez announced this week that what he hopes will be a final round of talks will convene in Geneva on March 2.

The American role, agreed to in December 1985, would be to serve as a guarantor of the accords that emerge from the Geneva negotiations. These include a declaration that the United States will not interfere in Afghanistan's affairs, implying an end to military aid to the guerrillas, contingent on an acceptable pullout timetable.

Pakistan has felt increasing pressure to get an agreement. Burdened by nearly three million Afghan refugees,

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Panama clarifies: Headquarters must go

PANAMA CITY — Panama accused the United States yesterday of distorting its call for the withdrawal of the U.S. Southern Command and said Washington had the right to keep troops in the country, but only to protect the Panama Canal. The call for the Southern Command pull-out "has been intentionally distorted and its contents have been intentionally evaded by U.S. officials who are pretending it refers to the U.S. military presence," a Foreign Ministry statement said.

The Panama Defense Forces (PDF), headed by Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega, called Monday for "the withdrawal of the Southern Command from our territory." The U.S. government flatly rejected that call, saying that under the 1977 treaties "we have every right to be there and we don't anticipate any change in that status."

It has been the target of air strikes Afghan planes in border areas where the guerrillas have bases. Pakistani leaders have expressed a growing eagerness to see the eight-year war end.